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I. Advances in the Acquisition of Secure 
Systems Based on Open Architectures   
Walt Scacchi and Thomas A. Alspaugh  
Institute for Software Research  
University of California, Irvine  
Irvine, CA 92697-3455 USA  
wscacchi@ics.uci.edu, thomas.alspaugh@acm.org  
Abstract  
The role of software acquisition ecosystems in the development and evolution 
of secure open architecture systems has received insufficient consideration. Such 
systems are composed of software components subject to different security 
requirements in an architecture in which evolution can occur by evolving existing 
components or by replacing them. However, this may result in possible security 
requirements conflicts and organizational liability for failure to fulfill security 
obligations. We have developed an approach for understanding and modeling 
software security requirements as “security licenses,” for analyzing conflicts among 
groups of such licenses in realistic system contexts, and for guiding the acquisition, 
integration, or development of systems with open source components in such an 
environment. Consequently, this paper reports on our efforts to extend our existing 
approach to specifying and analyzing software intellectual property licenses to now 
address software security licenses that can be associated with secure OA systems.  
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serves as Co-Chair of the Software Engineering in Practice (SEIP) Track at the 33rd 
International Conference on Software Engineering, May 21–28, 2011, Honolulu, HI.  
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Irvine. His research interests are in software engineering and software requirements. 
Before completing his Ph.D., he worked as a software developer, team lead, and 
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on the Software Cost Reduction project, also known as the A-7E project.  
A. Introduction  
A substantial number of development organizations are adopting a strategy in 
which a software-intensive system is developed with an open architecture (OA; 
Oreizy, 2000), whose components may be open source software (OSS) or 
proprietary with open application programming interfaces (APIs). Such systems 
evolve not only through the evolution of their individual components, but also 
through replacement of one component by another, possibly from a different 
producer or under a different license. With this approach to software system 
acquisition, the system development organization becomes an integrator of 
components largely produced elsewhere that are interconnected through open APIs 
as necessary to achieve the desired result. 
An OA development process arises in a software acquisition ecosystem in 
which the integrator is influenced from one direction by the goals, interfaces, license 
choices, and release cycles of the component producers, and in another direction by 
the needs of its consumers. As a result, the software components are reused more 
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costs, increased reliability, and potentially increased agility in evolving to meet 
changing needs.  
An emerging challenge is to realize the benefits of this approach when the 
individual components are subject to different security requirements. This may arise 
due either to how a component’s external interfaces are specified and defended, or 
to how system components are interconnected and configured in ways that can or 
cannot defend the composed system from security vulnerabilities and external 
exploits. Ideally, any software element in a system composed from components from 
different producers can have its security capabilities specified, analyzed, and 
implemented at system architectural design-time, build-time, or at deployment run-
time. Such capability-based security in its simplest form specifies what types, value 
ranges, and values of data, or control signals (e.g., program invocations, procedure 
or method calls), can be input, output, or handed off to a software plug-in or external 
(helper) application from a software component or composed system.  
When designing a secure OA system, decisions and trade-offs must be made 
as to what level of security is required, as well as to what kinds of threats to security 
must be addressed. The universe of possible security threats is continually emerging 
and the cost/effort of defending against them is ongoing. Similarly, anticipating all 
possible security vulnerabilities or threats is impractical (or impossible). Further, 
though it may be desirable that all systems be secure, different systems need 
different levels of security, which may come at ever greater cost or inconvenience in 
order to accommodate. Strategic systems may need the greatest security possible, 
whereas other systems may require much less rigorous security mechanisms. Thus, 
finding an affordable, scalable, and testable means for specifying the security 
requirements of software components, or OA systems composed with components 
with different security requirements, is the goal of our research.  
The most basic form of security requirements that can be asserted and tested 
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actual functional or processing capabilities of the computational systems on which 
they operate, and instead provide a limited functionality computing surround (or 
“sandbox”). VM can isolate a given component or system, other software 
applications, utilities, repositories, or external/remote control data access (input or 
output). The capabilities for a VM (e.g., an explicit, pre-defined list of approved 
operating system commands or programs that can write data or access a repository) 
can be specified as testable conditions that can be assigned to users or programs 
authorized to operate within the VM. The VM technique is now widely employed 
through software “hypervisors” (e.g., IBM VM/370, VMware, VirtualBox, Parallels 
Desktop for Mac) that isolate software applications and operating systems from the 
underlying system platform or hardware. Such VM act like “containment vessels” 
through which it is possible to specify barriers to entry (and exit) of data and control 
via security capabilities that restrict other programs. Thus, these capabilities specify 
what rights or obligations may be, or may not be, available for access or update to 
data or control information. Thus, architectural design-time decisions pertaining to 
specifying the security rights or obligations for the overall system or its components 
are done by specification of VM that contain the composed system or its 
components. These rights or obligations can be specified as pre-conditions on input 
data or control signals, or post-conditions on output data or control signals.  
The problem of specifying the build-time and run-time security requirements 
of OA systems is different from that at design-time. In determining how to specify the 
software build sequence, security requirements are manifest as capabilities that may 
be specific to explicitly declared versions of designated programs. For example, if an 
OA system at design-time specifies a “Web browser” as one of its components, at 
build-time a particular Web browser (Mozilla Firefox or Internet Explorer) must then 
be specified, as must its baseline version (e.g., Firefox 4.0 or Internet Explorer 9.0). 
However, if the resulting run-time version of the OA system must instead employ a 
locally available Web browser (e.g., Firefox 3.6.1 or Internet Explorer 8.0 Service 
Pack 2), then the OA system integrators may either need to produce multiple run-
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version of the necessary component (e.g., Firefox 3.5 or Internet Explorer 7.0) that is 
“upward compatible” with newer browser versions, (b) a stub or abstract program 
interface that allows for a later designated compatible component version to be 
installed/used at run-time, or else (c) create different run-time version alternatives 
(i.e., variants) of the target OA systems that may or may not be “backward 
compatible” with the legacy system component versions available in the deployment 
run-time environment. The need to specify build-time and run-time components by 
hierarchical version numbers like Firefox 3.6.16.144 (and possibly timestamps of 
their creation or local installation) arises because evolutionary version updates often 
include security patches that close known vulnerabilities or prevent known exploits. 
As indicated in Section 2, Related Work, security attacks often rely on system entry 
through known vulnerabilities that are present in earlier versions of software 
components that have not been updated to newer versions that don’t have the same 
vulnerabilities.  
Because we have been able to address an analogous problem of how to 
specify and analyze the intellectual property rights and obligations of the licenses of 
software components, our efforts now focus on the challenge of how to specify and 
analyze software components and composed system security rights and obligations 
using a new information structure we call a “security license.” The actual form of 
such a security license is still to be finalized, but at this point, we believe it is 
appropriate to begin to develop candidate forms or types of security licenses for 
further research and development, especially for security license forms that can be 
easily formalized, readily applied to large-scale OA systems, and be automatically 
analyzed or tested in ways that we have already established (Alspaugh, Asuncion, & 
Scacchi, 2010; Alspaugh, Scacchi, & Asuncion, 2010). This is another goal of our 
research here.  
Next, the challenge of specifying secure software systems composed from 
secure or insecure components is inevitably entwined with the software ecosystems 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 6 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
ecosystem involves organizations and individuals producing and consuming 
components, and supply paths from producer to consumer; but also  
 the OA of the system(s) in question, and how best to secure it,  
 the open interfaces provided by the components, and how to specify 
their security requirements, 
 the degree of coupling in the evolution of related components that can 
be assessed in terms of how security rights and obligations may 
change, and  
 the rights and obligations resulting from the security licenses under 
which various components are released that propagate from producers 
to consumers.  
An example of a software acquisition ecosystem producing and integrating 










Figure 1. An Example of a Software Acquisition Ecosystem in Which  
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In order to most effectively use an OA approach in developing and evolving a 
system, it is essential to consider this OA ecosystem. An OA system draws on 
components from proprietary vendors and open source projects. Its architecture is 
made possible by the existing general ecosystem of producers, from which the initial 
components are chosen. The choice of a specific OA begins a specialized software 
ecosystem involving components that meet (or can be shimmed to meet) the open 
interfaces used in the architecture. We do not claim that this is the best or the only 
way to reuse components or to produce secure OA systems, but it is an ever more 
widespread way. In this paper we built on previous work on heterogeneously 
licensed systems (Alspaugh, Asuncion, et al., 2009a; German & Hassan, 2009; 
Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008) by examining how OA development affects and is 
affected by software ecosystems and the role of security licenses for components 
included within OA software ecosystems.  
In the remainder of this paper, we survey some related work (Section 2), 
define and examine characteristics of open architectures with or without secure 
software elements (Section 3), define and examine characteristics for how secure 
OA systems evolve (Section 4), introduce a structure for security licenses (Section 
5), outline security license architectures (Section 6), and sketch our approach for 
security license analysis (Section 7). We then close with a discussion addressing 
how our software license and analysis scheme relates to software product lines 
(Section 8) before stating our conclusions (Section 9).  
B. Related Work  
Software systems, whether operating as standalone components or as 
elements within large system compositions, are continuously being subjected to 
security attacks. These attacks seek to slip through software vulnerabilities known to 
the attackers but perhaps not to the system integrators or consumers. These attacks 
often seek to access, manipulate, or remotely affect the data values or control 
signals that a component or composed system processes for nefarious purposes or 
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attacks like Stuxnet (Falliere, Murchu, & Chien, 2011) reveal that security attacks 
may be very well planned and employ a bundle of attack vectors and social 
engineering tactics in order for the attack to reach strategic systems that are mostly 
isolated and walled off from public computer networks. The Stuxnet attack entered 
through software system interfaces at either the component, application subsystem, 
or base operating system level (e.g., via removable thumb drive storage devices), 
and their goal was to go outside or beneath their entry context. However, all of the 
Stuxnet attacks on the targeted software system could be blocked or prevented 
through security capabilities associated with the open software interfaces that would 
(a) limit access or evolutionary update rights lacking proper authorization, as well as 
through (b) “sandboxing” (i.e., isolating) and holding up any evolutionary updates 
(the attacks) prior to their installation and run-time deployment. Furthermore, 
because the Stuxnet attack involved the use of corrupted certificates of trust from 
approved authorities as false credentials that allowed evolutionary system updates 
to go forward, it seems clear that additional preventions are needed that are external 
to, and prior to, their installation and run-time deployment. In our case, that means 
that we need to specify and analyze software security requirements and evolutionary 
update capabilities at architectural design-time and system integration build-time, 
and then reconcile those with the run-time system composition. It also calls for the 
need to maintain the design-time, build-time, and run-time system compositions in 
repositories remote from system installations, and in possibly redundant locations 
that can be encrypted, randomized, fragmented, and dispersed (e.g., via Torrents or 
“onion routing”) then cross-checked and independently verified prior to run-time 
deployment in a high security system application.  
As already noted, both software intellectual property licenses and security 
licenses represent a collection of rights and obligations for what can or cannot be 
done with a licensed software component. Licenses thus denote non-functional 
requirements that apply to a software system or system components as intellectual 
property (IP) or security requirements (i.e., capabilities) during their development 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 9 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
constraints applicable only to software as IP. Instead, they can be written in ways 
that stipulate non-functional requirements of different kinds. Consider, for example, 
that desired or necessary software system security properties can also be expressed 
as rights and obligations addressing system confidentiality, integrity, accountability, 
system availability, and assurance (Breaux & Anton, 2005, 2008). Traditionally, 
developing robust specifications for non-functional software system security 
properties in natural language often produces specifications that are ambiguous, 
misleading, inconsistent across system components, and lacking sufficient details 
(Yau & Chen, 2006). Using a semantic model to formally specify the rights and 
obligations required for a software system or component to be secure (Breaux & 
Anton, 2005, 2008; Yau & Chen, 2006) means that it may be possible to develop 
both a “security architecture” notation and model specification that associates given 
security rights and obligations across a software system or system of systems. 
Similarly, it suggests the possibility of developing computational tools or interactive 
architecture development environments that can be used to specify, model, and 
analyze a software system’s security architecture at different times in its 
development—design-time, build-time, and run-time. The approach we have been 
developing for the past few years for modeling and analyzing software system IP 
license architectures for OA systems (Alspaugh, Asuncion, et al., 2009b, 2010; 
Aslpaugh, Scacchi, et al., 2010; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008) may therefore be 
extendable to also being able to address OA systems with heterogeneous “software 
security license” rights and obligations. Furthermore, the idea of common or 
reusable software security licenses may be analogous to the reusable security 
requirements templates proposed by Firesmith (2004) at the Software Engineering 
Institute. But such an exploration and extension of the semantic software license 
modeling, meta-modeling, and computational analysis tools to also support software 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 10 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
C. Secure Open Architecture Composition   
Open architecture (OA) software is a customization technique introduced by 
Oreizy (2000) that enables third parties to modify a software system through its 
exposed architecture, evolving the system by replacing its components. Increasingly 
more software-intensive systems are developed using an OA strategy, not only with 
open source software (OSS) components but also proprietary components with open 
APIs. Similarly, these components may or may not have their own security 
requirements that must be satisfied during their build-time integration or run-time 
deployment, such as registering the software component for automatic update and 
installation of new software versions that patch recently discovered security 
vulnerabilities or prevent invocation of known exploits. Using this approach can 
lower development costs and increase reliability and function as well as adaptively 
evolve software security (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008). Composing a system with 
heterogeneously secured components, however, increases the likelihood of 
conflicts, liabilities, and no-rights stemming from incompatible security requirements. 
Thus, in our work we define a secure OA system as a software system consisting of 
components that are either open source or proprietary with open API, whose overall 
system rights at a minimum allow its use and redistribution, in full or in part, such 
that they do not introduce new security vulnerabilities at the system architectural 
level.  
It may appear that using a system architecture that incorporates secure OSS 
and proprietary components and uses open APIs will result in a secure OA system. 
However, not all such architectures will produce a secure OA because the (possibly 
empty) set of available license rights for an OA system depends on (a) how and why 
secure or insecure components and open APIs are located within the system 
architecture, (b) how components and open APIs are implemented, embedded, or 
interconnected, and (c) the degree to which the IP and security licenses of different 
OSS components encumber all or part of a software system’s architecture into which 
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The following kinds of software elements appearing in common software 
architectures can affect whether the resulting systems are open or closed (Bass, 
Clements, & Kazman, 2003).  
Software source code components—These can be either (a) standalone 
programs, (b) libraries, frameworks, or middleware, (c) inter-application script code 
such as C shell scripts, (d) intra-application script code, such as for creating Rich 
Internet Applications using domain-specific languages such as XUL for the Firefox 
Web browser (Feldt, 2007) or “mashups” (Nelson & Churchill, 2006), whose source 
code is available and they can be rebuilt, or (e) similar script code that can either 
install and invoke externally developed plug-in software components or invoke 
external application (helper) components. Each may have its own distinct IP/security 
requirements.  
Executable components—These components are in binary form and the 
source code may not be open for access, review, modification, or possible 
redistribution (Rosen, 2005). If proprietary, they often cannot be redistributed, and so 
such components will be present in the design- and run-time architectures but not in 
the distribution-time architecture.  
Software services—An appropriate software service can replace a source 
code or executable component.  
Application programming interfaces/APIs—Availability of externally visible 
and accessible APIs is the minimum requirement for an “open system” (Meyers & 
Oberndorf, 2001). 
Software connectors—The intended purpose of this software is to provide a 
standard or reusable way of communication through common interfaces (e.g., High 
Level Architecture [Kul, Weatherly, & Dahmann, 1999], CORBA, MS .NET, 
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Connectors can also limit the propagation of IP license obligations or provide 
additional security capabilities.  
Methods of connection—These include linking as part of a configured 
subsystem, dynamic linking, and client-server connections. Methods of connection 
affect license obligation propagation, with different methods affecting different 
licenses.  
Configured system or subsystem architectures—These are software 
systems that are used as atomic components of a larger system and whose internal 
architecture may comprise components with different licenses, affecting the overall 
system license and its security requirements. To minimize license interaction, a 
configured system or sub-architecture may be surrounded by what we term a license 
firewall, namely a layer of dynamic links, client-server connections, license shims, or 
other connectors that block the propagation of reciprocal obligations.  
Figure 2 shows a high-level, run-time view of a composed OA system whose 
reference architectural design in Figure 3 includes all of the kinds of software 
elements listed in the previous paragraphs. This reference architecture has been 
instantiated in a build-time configuration in Figure 4 that in turn could be realized in 
alternative run-time configurations in Figures 5, 6, and 7 with different security 
capabilities. The configured systems consist of software components such as a 
Mozilla Web browser, Gnome Evolution email client, and AbiWord word processor 
(similar to MS Word), all running on a RedHat Fedora Linux operating system 
accessing file, print, and other remote networked servers such as an Apache Web 
server. The components are interconnected through a set of software connectors 
that bridge the interfaces of components and combine the provided functionality into 
the system’s services. However, note how the run-time software architecture does 
not pre-determine how security capabilities will be assigned and distributed across 









Figure 2. An Example Composite OA System Potentially Subject to Different  









Figure 3. The Design-Time Architecture of the System in Figure 2  









Figure 4. A Secure Build-Time Architecture Describing the Version Running in  









Figure 5. Instantiated Build-Time OA System with Maximum Security  










Figure 6. Instantiated Build-Time OA System with Minimum Security Architecture  
of Figure 4 Via a Single Overall Security Containment Vessel for the Complete 









Figure 7. Instantiated Build-Time OA System with Mixed Security Architecture of  
Figure 4 Via Security Containment Vessels for Some Groupings of System 
Elements 
D. OA System Evolution  
An OA system can evolve by a number of distinct mechanisms, some of 
which are common to all systems but others of which are a result of heterogeneous 
IP and security licenses in a single system.  
1. By component evolution 
One or more components can evolve, altering the overall system’s 
characteristics (for example, upgrading and replacing the Firefox Web browser from 
version 3.5 to 3.6, which may update existing software functionality while also 
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2. By component replacement 
One or more components may be replaced by others with different behaviors 
but the same interface, or with a different interface and with the addition of shim 
code to make it match (for example, replacing the AbiWord word processor with 
either Open Office or MS Word, depending on which is considered the least 
vulnerable to security attack).  
3. By architecture evolution 
The OA can evolve, using the same components but in a different 
configuration, altering the system’s characteristics. For example, as discussed in 
Section 3, changing the configuration in which a component is connected can 
change how its IP or security license affects the rights and obligations for the overall 
system. This could arise when replacing email and word processing applications 
with web services like Google Mail and Google Docs, which we might assume may 
be more secure because the Google services (operating in a cloud environment) 
may not be easily accessed or penetrated by a security attack. 
4. By component license evolution 
The license under which a component is available may change, as for 
example when the license for the Mozilla core components was changed from the 
Mozilla Public License (MPL) to the current Mozilla Disjunctive Tri-License; or the 
component may be made available under a new version of the same license, as for 
example when the GNU General Public License (GPL) version 3 was released. 
Similarly, the security license for a component may be changed by its producers, or 
the security license for a composed system changed by its integrators, in order to 
prevent or deter recently discovered security vulnerabilities or exploits before an 
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5. By a change to the desired rights or acceptable obligations 
The OA system’s integrator or consumers may desire additional IP or security 
license rights (for example the right to sublicense in addition to the right to 
distribute), or no longer desire specific rights; or the set of license obligations they 
find acceptable may change. In either case, the OA system evolves, whether by 
changing components, evolving the architecture, or other means in order to provide 
the desired rights within the scope of the acceptable obligations. For example, they 
may no longer be willing or able to provide the source code for components that 
have known vulnerabilities that have not been patched and eliminated.  
 
Figure 8. A Second Instantiation at Run-Time  
Note. This is the OA system in Figures 2, 3, and 4 (Firefox, Google Docs and 
Calendar operating within different Firefox run-time sessions, Fedora) as an 
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The interdependence of integrators and producers results in a co-evolution of 
software within an OA ecosystem. Closely-coupled components from different 
producers must evolve in parallel in order for each to provide its services, as 
evolution in one will typically require a matching evolution in the other. Producers 
may manage their evolution with a loose coordination among releases, for example 
as between the Gnome and Mozilla organizations. Each release of a producer 
component creates a tension through the ecosystem relationships with consumers 
and their releases of OA systems using those components, because integrators 
accommodate the choices of available, supported components with their own goals 
and needs. As discussed in our previous work (Alspaugh, Asuncion, et al., 2009a), 
license rights and obligations are manifested at each component’s interface, then 
mediated through the system’s OA to entail the rights and corresponding obligations 
for the system as a whole. As a result, integrators must frequently re-evaluate an OA 
system’s IP/security rights and obligations. In contrast to homogeneously-licensed 
systems, license change across versions is a characteristic of OA ecosystems, and 
architects of OA systems require tool support for managing the ongoing licensing 
changes.  
We propose that such support must have several characteristics.  
 It must rest on a license structure of rights and obligations (Section 5), 
focusing on obligations that are enactable and testable.  
 It must take account of the distinctions between the design-time, build-
time, and distribution-time architectures (Sections 3, 5, 6) and the 
rights and obligations that come into play for each of them. 
 It must distinguish the architectural constructs significant for software 
licenses, and embody their effects on rights and obligations (Section 
3).  
 It must define license architectures (Section 6).  
 It must provide an automated environment for creating and managing 
license architectures. We are developing a prototype that manages a 
license architecture as a view of its system architecture (Alspaugh, 
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 Finally, it must automate calculations on system rights and obligations 
so that they may be done easily and frequently, whenever any of the 
factors affecting rights and obligations may have changed (Section 7).  
E. Security Licenses  
Licenses typically impose obligations that must be met in order for the 
licensee to realize the assigned rights. Common IP/copyright license obligations 
include the obligation to publish at no cost any source code you modify (MPL) or the 
reciprocal obligation to publish all source code included at build-time or statically 
linked (GPL). The obligations may conflict, as when a GPL’d component’s reciprocal 
obligation to publish source code of other components is combined with a 
proprietary component’s license prohibition of publishing its source code. In this 
case, no rights may be available for the system as a whole, not even the right of use, 
because the two obligations cannot simultaneously be met and thus neither 
component can be used as part of the system. Security capabilities can similarly be 
expressed and bound to the data values and control signals that are visible in 
component interfaces, or through component connectors.  
Some typical security rights and obligations might be 
 the right to read data in containment vessel T,   
 the obligation for a specific component to have been vetted for the 
capability to read and update data in containment vessel T,  
 the obligation for a user to verify his/her authority to see containment 
vessel T by password or other specified authentication process, 
 the right to replace specified component C with some other 
component,   
 the right to add or update specified component D in a specified 
configuration, and   
 the right to add, update, or remove a security mechanism. 
The basic relationship between software IP/security license rights and 
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the corresponding rights are granted. For example, if you publish your modified 
source code and sub-licensed derived works under MPL, then you get all of the MPL 
rights for both the original and the modified code. Similarly, software security 
requirements are specified as security obligations that when met, allow designated 
users or other software programs to access, modify, and redistribute data and 
control information to designated repositories or remote services. However, license 
details are complex, subtle, and difficult to comprehend and track—it is easy to 
become confused or make mistakes. The challenge is multiplied when dealing with 
configured system architectures that compose a large number of components with 
heterogeneous IP/security licenses, so that the need for legal counsel begins to 
seem inevitable (Fontana et al., 2008; Rosen, 2005).  
We have developed an approach for expressing software licenses of different 
types (intellectual property and security requirements) that is more formal and less 
ambiguous than natural language, and that allows us to calculate and identify 
conflicts arising from the rights and obligations of two or more components’ licenses. 
Our approach is based on Hohfeld’s (1913) classic group of eight fundamental jural 
relations, of which we use right, duty, no-right, and privilege. We start with a tuple 
<actor, operation, action, object> for expressing a right or obligation. The actor is the 
“licensee” for all of the licenses we have examined. The operation is one of the 
following: may, must, must not, or need not, with may and need not expressing 
rights and must and must not expressing obligations. The action is a verb or verb 
phrase describing what may, must, must not, or need not be done, with the object 
completing the description. A license may be expressed as a set of rights, with each 
right associated with zero or more obligations that must be fulfilled in order to enjoy 

















Figure 9. Security License Meta-Model  
Designers of secure systems have developed a number heuristics to guide 
architectural design in order to satisfy overall system security requirements while 
avoiding conflicts among interacting security mechanisms or defenses. However, 
even using design heuristics (and there are many), keeping track of security rights 
and obligations across components that are interconnected in complex OAs quickly 
becomes too cumbersome. Automated support is needed to manage the complexity 
of multi-component system compositions where different security requirements must 
be addressed through different security capabilities. 
F. Security License Architectures  
Our security license model forms a basis for effective reasoning about 
licenses in the context of actual systems and for calculating the resulting rights and 
obligations. In order to do so, we need a certain amount of information about the 
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needed information comprises the license architecture, and an abstraction of the 
system architecture:  
1. the set of components of the system (for example, see Figure 2) for the 
current system configuration, as well as subsequently for system 
evolution update versions (as seen in Figure 8); 
2. the relation mapping each component to its security requirements 
(specified and analyzed at design-time, as exemplified in Figure 3) or 
capabilities (specified and analyzed at build-time in Figure 4 and run-
time across alternatives shown in Figure 5, 6, and 7);  
3. the connections between components and the security requirements or 
capabilities of each connector passing data or control signals to/from it; 
and 
4. possibly other information, such as information to detect or prevent IP 
and security requirements conflicts, which is as yet undetermined. 
With this information and definitions of the licenses involved, we believe it is 
possible to automatically calculate rights and obligations for individual components 
or for the entire system as well as to guide/assess system design and evolution 
using an automated environment of the kind that we have previously demonstrated 
(Alspaugh, Asuncion, et al., 2009a, 2009b, 2010; Alspaugh, Schacchi, et al., 2010).  
G. Security License Analysis  
Given a specification of a software system’s architecture, we can associate 
security license attributes with the system’s components, connectors, and sub-
system architectures, resulting in a license architecture for the system, and we can 
calculate the security rights and obligations for the system’s configuration. Due to 
the complexity of license architecture analysis, and the need to re-analyze every 
time a component evolves, a component’s security license changes, a component is 
substituted, or the system architecture changes, OA integrators really need an 
automated license architecture analysis environment. We have developed a 
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licenses (Alspaugh, Asuncion, et al., 2009b; Alspaugh, Schacchi, et al., 2010), and 
are extending this approach to security licenses.  
1. Security Obligation Conflicts  
A security obligation can conflict with another obligation, a related right for the 
same or nearby components, or with the set of available security rights by requiring 
a right that has not been granted. For instance, consider two connected components 
C and D with the following security obligations.  
(O1) The obligation for component C to have been vetted for the capability to 
read and update data in containment vessel T  
(O2) The obligation for all components connected to specified component D 
to grant it the capability to read and update data in containment vessel T  
If C has not been vetted, then these two obligations conflict. This possible 
conflict must be taken into consideration in different ways at different development 
times:  
 at design time, ensuring that it will be possible to vet C;  
 at build time, ensuring that the specific implementation of C has been 
vetted successfully; and  
 possibly at run time as well, confirming that C is certified to have been 
vetted, or (if C is dynamically connected at run time) vetting C before 
trusting the connection to it.  
The second obligation may also conflict with the set of available security 
rights, for example if D is connected to component E for which the security right  
(R1) to read and update data in containment vessel T using component E is 
not available.  
The absence of such conflicts does not mean, of course, that the system is 
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2. Rights and Obligations Calculations  
The rights available for the entire system (the right to read and update data in 
containment vessel T, the right to replace components with other components, the 
right to update component security licenses, etc.) are calculated as the intersection 
of the sets of security rights available for each component of the system. If a conflict 
is found involving the obligations and rights of interacting components, it is possible 
for the system architect to consider an alternative scheme (e.g., using one or more 
connectors along the paths between the components that act as a security firewall). 
This means that the architecture and the automated environment together can 
determine what OA design best meets the problem at hand with available software 
components. Components with conflicting security licenses do not need to be 
arbitrarily excluded, but instead may expand the range of possible architectural 
alternatives if the architect seeks such flexibility and choice.  
H. Discussion  
Our approach to specifying and analyzing the security requirements for a 
complex OA system is based on the use of a security license. As noted, a security 
license is a new kind of information structure whose purpose is to declare 
operational capabilities that express the obligations and rights of users or programs 
to access, manipulate, control, update, or evolve data, control signals, and 
accessible software system elements. Our proposed security license is influenced by 
IP licenses that are employed to specify property control and declared copyright 
freedoms/restrictions, such as those for OSS components subject to licenses like the 
GPLv2, MPL, LGPL, or others. These IP licenses as information structures often 
pre-exist to facilitate their widespread use, dissemination, and common 
interpretation. Further, the choice of which IP license to choose or assign to a 
software component results from a trade-off analysis typically performed by the 
components producers, rather than by the system integrators or consumers as a 
way to protect or propagate the obligations and rights to use, evolve, and redistribute 
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The security licenses we propose may or not necessarily exist prior to their 
specification and assignment to a given OA system. Similarly, we may anticipate or 
expect that generic security licenses will emerge and be assigned by software 
component producers, as they have for OSS components, though no such security 
licenses from producers yet exist. However, one follow-on goal we seek to address 
is whether and how best to specify security licenses for different types of software 
elements or components so that it becomes possible to semi-automatically specify 
the security license for a given component or composed OA system through the 
reuse and instantiation of security requirement templates. This idea is somewhat 
similar to the license templates and taxonomy that is employed by the Creative 
Commons for non-software intellectual property like online art or new media content 
(see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/). In this regard, it may be possible to 
develop a technique and supporting computational environment whereby system 
integrators or consumers can conveniently specify the security requirements they 
seek (e.g., fill out online security requirements forms), while the environment 
interprets these specifications to generate operational security capabilities that can 
guard the entry and exit of data or control information from the appropriate 
containment vessel that encapsulates the corresponding system element. 
Consequently, this is a topic for further study and investigation. 
Next, one might wonder why it is not simply desirable to have maximum 
system security under all circumstances. When considering the alternative run-time 
system composition variants shown in Figures 5, 6, and 7, it appears that there may 
be trade-offs in one layout of security capabilities over another. For example, the 
layout in Figure 5 maximizes security by encapsulating each system element within 
its own containment vessel. This in turn requires a VM technology of a kind different 
from that commonly available (e.g., like VMware), and instead requires a new 
lightweight VM technology that can provide security capabilities (e.g., create, read, 
update authorizations) for potentially small-scale software elements (e.g., Cshell 
inter-application integration or run-time scripts). Similarly, the different security 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 29 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
and associated level of security administration. But these again all represent trade-
offs in the desire to achieve affordable, practical, and evermore robust and testable 
secure software component/system capabilities build-time and run-time. Thus, we 
take the position that it is better to provide the ability to specify and analyze the 
security requirements of different software elements at design-time, as well as to 
specify and analyze the security capabilities at build-time and run-time, rather than 
the current practice that does not account for system architecture nor license 
architecture and is thus inherently vulnerable to attacks that can otherwise be 
prevented or detected. 
One other topic follows from our approach to semantically modeling and 
analyzing OA systems that are subject to software security licenses. More 
specifically, how our approach and emerging results might shed light on software 
systems whose architectures articulate a software product line.  
Accordingly, organizing and developing software product lines (SPLs) relies 
on the development and use of explicit software architectures (Bosch, 2000; 
Clements & Northrop, 2001). However, the architecture of a secure SPL is not 
necessarily a secure OA—there is no requirement for it to be so. Thus, we are 
interested in discussing what happens when SPLs may conform to a secure OA, and 
to an OA that may be composed from secure SPL components. Three 
considerations come to mind.  
First, if the SPL is subject to a single homogeneous security software license, 
which may often be the case when a single vendor or government contractor has 
developed the SPL, then the security license may act to reinforce a vendor lock-in 
situation with its customers. One of the motivating factors for OA is the desire to 
avoid such lock-in, whether or not the SPL components have open or standards-
compliant APIs.  
Second, if an OA system employs a reference architecture much like we have 
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specific software product configuration (as suggested in the build-time architecture 
shown in Figure 4), then such a reference or design-time architecture as we have 
presented it here effectively defines an SPL consisting of possible different system 
instantiations composed from similar components instances (e.g., different but 
equivalent Web browsers, word processors, email, calendaring applications, 
relational database management systems).  
Third, if the SPL is based on an OA that integrates software components from 
multiple vendors or OSS components that are subject to heterogeneous security 
licenses (i.e., those that may possibly conflict with one another), then we have the 
situation analogous to what we have presented in this paper. Thus, secure SPL 
concepts are compatible with secure OA systems that are composed from 
heterogeneously security licensed components. 
I. Conclusion  
This paper introduces the concept and initial scheme for systematically 
specifying and analyzing the security requirements for complex open architecture 
systems. We argue that such requirements should be expressed as operational 
capabilities that can be collected and sequenced within a new information structure 
we call a security license. Such a license expresses security in terms of capabilities 
that provide users or programs with obligations and rights for how they may access 
data or control information as well as how they may update or evolve system 
elements. Thus, these security license rights and obligations play a key role in how 
and why an OA system evolves in its ecosystem of software component producers, 
system integrators, and consumers.  
We note that changes to the license obligations and rights, whether for control 
of intellectual property or software security, across versions of components is a 
characteristic of OA systems whose components are subject to different security 
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and automated support for calculating its rights and obligations are needed in order 
to manage an OA system’s evolution in the context of its ecosystem.  
We have outlined an approach for achieving these and sketched how they 
further the goal of reusing components in developing software-intensive systems. 
Much more work remains to be done, but we believe that this approach turns a 
vexing problem into one for which workable, as well as robust formal, solutions can 
be obtained.  
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Abstract 
Heterogeneously licensed systems pose new challenges to architects and 
designers seeking to develop systems with appropriate intellectual property rights 
and obligations. In extreme cases, license conflicts may prevent a system’s legal 
use. Our previous work showed that rights, obligations, and conflicts can be 
calculated. However, architects benefit from fuller information than simply (for 
example) a list of conflicts. In this work we demonstrate an approach for presenting 
intellectual property results in terms of the arguments supporting them. The network 
of argumentation provides not only an explanation of each conclusion, but also a 
guide to the tradeoffs available in choosing among design alternatives with different 
licensing results. The approach has been integrated into the ArchStudio software 
architecture environment. We present an illustrative example of its use. 
A. Introduction 
An increasing number of development organizations are adopting a strategy 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 36 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
(HtL) components, with different components governed by different software 
licenses. The components are either open source software (OSS) or proprietary 
software with open application programming interfaces (APIs), and are combined in 
an open architecture (OA) in which components with comparable interfaces can be 
substituted for each other (Oreizy, 2000). Under this strategy the development 
organization becomes an integrator of components largely produced elsewhere, 
interconnected to achieve the desired result. 
The resulting OA systems can achieve reuse benefits such as reduced costs, 
increased reliability, and potentially increased agility in evolving to meet changing 
needs. However, rather than a single proprietary license as when acquired from a 
proprietary vendor, or a single OSS license as in uniformly licensed OSS projects, 
the resulting system typically has no recognized single software license. Instead it 
has, strictly speaking, a virtual license (Alspaugh, Asuncion, & Scacchi, 2009) 
composed of each component’s rights and obligations for that component under its 
governing license. The rights available for the system as a whole are the intersection 
of the rights sets for each component. In some cases the licenses may produce 
conflicting obligations and this intersection is empty, leaving a system that cannot 
legally be used, distributed, or modified. An emerging challenge is to realize the 
reuse benefits of HtL systems while managing virtual licenses in order to ensure that 
the desired system rights are available for an acceptable set of obligations. 
In our previous work (summarized in Section 4) we described and 
implemented a novel approach for calculating conflicting obligations, unavailable 
rights, and virtual licenses in an architectural design context. Calculation is 
necessary because the number of entailments in a typical HtL system is large, the 
system’s architecture is constantly evolving, its design-, distribution-, and run-time 
architectures are often distinct, component licenses evolve and components are 
relicensed, and the consequences of infringement can be substantial. Therefore, 
identifying conflicts and virtual licenses through calculation is a substantial boon. 
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We present an approach in which arguments are used to explain the results 
of right and obligation calculations. The calculations proceed by elaborating a 
directed acyclic graph (dag) of inferences among rights to obligations for entities in 
the system architecture. In this work we reimplemented the software that performs 
the calculations so that the dag is retained in its entirety as the primary calculation 
product, containing within it the obligation conflicts, unavailable rights, and virtual 
license for the system under analysis. Then an explanation for a specific result 
corresponds to the traversal of a path through the dag, starting at the result in 
question and continuing until the question has been answered. 
 Conflicting obligations—The traversal branches for each obligation 
to show the desired rights, license provisions, and architectural entities 
from which that obligation is produced, and at the root of the traversal, 
show in what ways the obligations conflict.  
 Unavailable rights—For each such right, a traversal identifies the 
exclusive copyright right that subsumes the right in question, the 
architectural entity to which the right pertains, and why no right in the 
entity’s license grants the right in question. 
 Virtual license—Traversals show the chains of inference by which 
each right and obligation is entailed by the system architecture, the 
stated license for each component, and the desired rights for the 
system as a whole.  
The dag calculation algorithm follows the steps of legal reasoning (formalized 
to support automation) by which an informed analyst would reason out the results. 
Thus, the traversals follow inference paths that follow (in more detail) the paths by 









Figure 1. A Claim, Supported by Grounds, Their Pertinence to the  
Claim Justified by a Warrant, Whose Validity is Supported by Backing 
(diagram after [14]) 
B. Related Work 
The most influential approach for structuring legal arguments is that of 
Toulmin, Rieke, and Janik (1984), who classified the parts of arguments into claims, 
grounds, warrants, backing, qualifiers, and rebuttals, in a recursive structure with a 
diagrammatic notation outlined in Figure 1. This approach has spread beyond the 
area of legal arguments and is used in general rhetoric and computer science. 
Toulmin divides arguments into 
1. claims asserted to be true; 
2. for each claim whose truth is disputed, one or more grounds 
supporting it; 
3. if it is disputed whether a claim’s grounds suffice for it, then a warrant 
stating why the grounds entail the claim; and 
4. if the warrant is disputed, then backing supporting it. 
If a ground or backing is disputed, then it is made the claim of a lower level 
argument constructed in its support. The recursion of arguments continues as long 
as grounds or backings are in dispute, or until the original claim is abandoned. 
(Qualifiers and rebuttals address the degree of strength of arguments, and are not 
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Hohfeld (1913) sought a theory by which to resolve the imprecise terminology 
and ambiguous classifications he found in use for legal relationships. In a seminal 
article published in 1913 and cited to the present day, he set forth a system of eight 
jural relations intended to express and classify all legal relationships between 
people. The first four regulate ordinary actions and are right (may), no-right (cannot), 
duty (must), and privilege (need not). Each relation has an opposite relation whose 
sense is its opposite, and a correlative relation whose sense is its complement. We 
use Hohfeld’s first four jural relations as the basis of our representation of the 
enactable, testable provisions of software licenses (Section 4).  
There has been much work on analysis of laws in AI over the past few 
decades. A widely-cited example is Sergot et al.’s (1986) re-expression of the British 
Nationality Act as a Prolog program; the resulting program applied the Act to any 
person’s situation and characteristics in order to determine nationality (Sergot et al., 
1986). 
A number of researchers have used argumentation to guide decision-making, 
notably Haley, Laney, Moffett, and Nuseibeh (2008) who propose an approach for 
using satisfaction arguments to evaluate and guide the evolution of security 
requirements. Decision choices for which no convincing argument is found are set 
aside in favor of choices for which stronger arguments have been identified. 
C. Licensing Background 
1. Intellectual Property (IP) 
An individual can own a tangible thing and have property rights in it, such as 
the rights to use it, improve it, sell it or give it away, or prevent others from doing so, 
subject to some statutory restrictions. Similarly, an individual can own intellectual 
property (IP) of various types and have specific property rights in the intangible 
intellectual property, such as the rights to copy, use, change, distribute, or prevent 
others from doing so, again subject to some statutory restrictions. Software licenses 
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Code and by similar law in many other countries. It grants exclusive rights to the 
author of an original work in any tangible means of expression; namely the rights to 
 reproduce the copyrighted work, 
 distribute copies,  
 prepare derivative works,  
 distribute copies of derivative works, and  
 (for certain kinds of work) perform or display it.  
Because the rights are exclusive, an author can prevent others from 
exercising them, except as allowed by “fair use,” or an author can grant others any 
or all of the rights or any part of them; one of the functions of a software license is to 
grant such rights and define the conditions under which they are granted. 
2. Software Licenses 
Traditional proprietary licenses allow a company to retain control of software it 
produces and restrict the access and rights that outsiders can have. OSS licenses, 
on the other hand, encourage sharing and reuse of software and grant access and 
as many rights as possible. 
Academic OSS licenses such as the Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) 
license, the Apache Software License, and perl’s Artistic License (Alspaugh, n.d.) 
grant nearly all rights and impose few obligations. Typical academic license 
obligations are simply to not remove the copyright and license notices. 
Reciprocal OSS licenses impose an obligation that distributed modifications 
of reciprocally licensed software be freely licensed under the same license. 
Examples are the Lesser General Public License (LGPL), Mozilla Public License 
(MPL), and Common Public License (Alspaugh, n.d.). 
Some reciprocal licenses additionally require that software combined with the 
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under the same license. We term such licenses propagating; they are also known as 
strong copyleft licenses. Examples are the General Public License versions 2 and 3 
(GPLv2, GPLv3; Alspaugh, n.d.). 
Some OSS is multiply licensed, or distributed under two or more licenses. 
The MySQL database software is distributed either under GPLv2 for OSS projects or 
a proprietary license for commercial projects. The Mozilla Disjunctive Tri-License 
licenses the core Mozilla components under any of three licenses (MPL, GPL, or 
LGPL). 
3.  Licenses and Software Architectures 
Certain classes of architectural features affect the application and 
propagation of license provisions. The most common such features are listed below. 
A software architecture is composed of components, each of which is a “locus of 
computation and state” in a system, and connectors which link them and mediate 
interactions between them. 
Software source code components—These can be 
 standalone programs, 
 libraries, frameworks, or middleware, 
 inter-application script code such as C shell scripts, or 
 intra-application script code, for creating Rich Internet Applications 
using domain-specific languages like XUL for the Firefox Web browser 
[6] or “mashups”[9]. 
The distinguishing characteristic of a source code component is that its 
source code is available and it can be modified and rebuilt. Each may have its own 
explicit license, though often script code connecting programs and data flows has no 
stated license unless the script is substantial or proprietary. 
Executable components—These components are in binary form, with 
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(Rosen, 2005). If proprietary, they often cannot be redistributed, and so such 
components will be present in the design- and run-time architectures but not in the 
distribution-time architecture. 
Software services—An appropriate software service can replace a source 
code or executable component. 
APIs—These are not and cannot be licensed, but connections through APIs 
can be used to limit the propagation of some license obligations. 
Software connectors—These are software elements providing a standard or 
reusable way of communication through common interfaces, such as High Level 
Architecture, CORBA, or Enterprise Java Beans. Connectors can also limit the 
propagation of some license obligations. 
Methods of composition—These include linking as part of a configured 
subsystem, dynamic linking, and client-server connections. Methods of composition 
affect license obligation propagation, with different methods affecting different 
licenses. How and to what extent this occurs have not been resolved in court or in 
practice (Determann, 2006; Stoltz, 2005). 
Configured system or subsystem architectures—These are software 
systems used as atomic components of a larger system. Their internal architecture 
may contain subcomponents under several licenses, which may affect the rights and 
obligations for the configured (sub)system and the overall system containing it. To 
minimize license interaction, a configured system or subsystem architecture may be 
surrounded by what we term a license firewall (Alspaugh et al., 2009), namely a 
layer of dynamic links, client-server connections, license shims, or other connectors 
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4.  Heuristics for Designing HtL Systems 
HtL system designers have developed heuristics to guide architectural design 
while avoiding some license conflicts. 
First, it is possible to use a reciprocally licensed component through a license 
firewall that limits the scope of reciprocal obligations for specific licenses (depending 
on how the license provisions are interpreted). Rather than connecting conflicting 
components directly through static build-time links, the connection is made through a 
dynamic link, client-server protocol, license shim, or run-time plug-in. 
A second approach used by a number of large organizations is to avoid using 
any components with reciprocal licenses. Even using design heuristics such as 
these, keeping track of license rights and obligations across components that are 
interconnected in complex OAs quickly becomes cumbersome. Organizations 
wishing to follow a “best-of-breed” component selection policy, without regard to 
component licenses, face even steeper challenges. Automated support is needed to 
manage this multi-component, multi-license complexity. 
D.  License Rights and Obligations 
In our previous work (Alspaugh et al., 2009) we developed an approach for 
expressing software licenses that is more formal and less ambiguous than natural 
language, and that allows us to calculate rights and obligations for an HtL system 
and identify conflicts arising from the rights and obligations of two or more 
component’s licenses. Our approach is based on Hohfeld’s (1913) eight fundamental 
jural relations, of which we use right (may), duty (must), no-right (must not), and 
privilege (need not; see Figure 2). Each relation has a correlative relation, which in 
our context relates an obligation to its necessary right: 
 if actor A must perform action X, then A requires the correlative right to 
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  if actor A must not perform action X, then A requires the correlative 
right to not perform it, “A need not X.” 
We express rights and obligations as tuples (Figure 3): <actor, modality, 
action, object, license> The actor is either the “Licensee” or in a few cases 
“Licensor” for all of the enactable, testable provisions of the licenses we have 
examined (Alspaugh, Scacchi, & Asuncion, 2010). The modality is may or need not 
for a right and must or must not for an obligation. The action is a verb phrase acting 
on an object, describing what may, need not, must, or must not be done. The object 
is a module of the system or a related artifact such as a source file, the original 
version, documentation, and so forth. Typically a license right applies to any of a 
class of objects distributed under the license, such as any binary file or any modified 
source file; and the right’s obligations will apply to the same object or a related 
object, such as the right’s object’s sources or the right’s object’s originals. For this 
reason we term rights and obligations as expressed in a license abstract in contrast 
to a concrete right or obligation for one specific entity. Some actions are 
parameterized by a license as well. 
 









Figure 3. Metamodel for Software Licenses 
Because copyright rights are exclusive to the copyright holder and licensees, 
the actions in copyright rights are distinguished from other actions; rights with those 
actions are only available through the object’s license. Rights formed from all other 
actions are freely and immediately available, unless the object’s license obligations 
restrict them. 
A license is expressed as a set of rights, each right associated with zero or 
more obligations that must be fulfilled to be granted it, and possibly a set of overall 
obligations that must be fulfilled for the license as a whole. Figure 4 sketches two 
rights from GPL version 2.0 (GPLv2), the first with no obligations and the second 
with three corresponding obligations. 
The details of the license specification approach are described in our earlier 










Figure 4. Some Tuples for the GPLv2 License 
E. Applying Licenses to Software 
1.  Calculating the Inference Dag 
In order to obtain a particular desired right r for a specific module or other 
entity e, in other words a desired concrete right, one of two cases must hold: 
1. r is not subsumed by any of the five copyright rights and does not 
conflict with any general obligation of r’s license L. In this case r is 
freely available. 
2. r is subsumed by an abstract right R of the license, with e likewise 
subsumed by R’s object. In this case all R’s obligations O1, O2, . . . , 
on must be fulfilled, with their objects replaced by whatever function of 
e they signify in order for r to be granted. These could be e itself, all 
sources of e, the original version of e, and so forth. N may be zero, in 
which case L immediately grants r. 
Figure 5 illustrates one step of the application of a license to obtain a desired 
concrete right r. The license of r’s object shows two obligations O1 and O2 of R, 
which we apply to r’s object e in order to obtain r’s concrete obligations o1 and o2. 
Depending on what kind of object O1 has, o1 could apply to e itself, in which case e 
= e'1, or to an entity related to e, or (if L is a propagating license) to another module 
linked or otherwise connected to e. Finally, in order to fulfill o1 we must have o1’s 
correlative right r'1. The same considerations apply for O2, of course. The heavy 
arrow shows the flow of inference from desired concrete right through to required 
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If r'1 (r'2) is immediately available, its branch of the inference is complete. If 
not, the process recurses from r'1 (r'2). 
The license rights and obligations for an entire system are calculated by 
repeating this process for every module of the system. If all modules are under the 
same license, analogous rights and obligations are obtained for every module. If the 
system is heterogeneously licensed, however, the calculation is much more varied, 
and if some of the modules are propagationally licensed then a right for one of those 
modules can produce obligations for other modules of the system. Such an 
architecture can easily result in license conflicts, as for example when a license 
propagates the obligation to be sublicensed under the same license to a proprietary 
component whose license forbids sublicensing. In such a case, the calculation will 
fail to produce a simultaneously satisfiable collection of obligations, and no rights will 









Figure 5. A Step in a Rights/Obligations Inference 
Figure 6 shows in Toulmin form a portion of an example inference that 
produces a conflict, involving a component e1 obtained under GPLv2 and modified, 
linked to a component e2 obtained under the proprietary Corel Transactional 
License (CTL; Alspaugh, n.d.). The architectural connection between e1 and e2 is 
one that is interpreted for this inference as propagating GPLv2 obligations, such as a 
static link. The right to distribute copies of the containing system is desired. In our 
prototype implementation (Figure 8) these arguments are presented in outline form, 
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to be expanded as desired if further explanation is needed. A typical use would be 
the following: 
1. Why does the WordProcessor component need to be sublicensed 
under GPLv2? 
2. It is in the static-linked scope of the GnomeEvolution component; that 
component is annotated with the GPLv2 license; and GPLv2 obligates 
sublicensing under GPLv2 (GPLv2 x2.2{1.bs1). 
3. Why can’t the WordProcessor component be sublicensed under 
GPLv2? 
4. The WordProcessor component in the architecture has been annotated 










Figure 6. Toulmin-structured Arguments Supporting (and explaining) a  
typical conflict between obligations for a GPLv2 and a proprietary component 
2. Explanation by Argumentation 
Figure 7 shows the two explanation flows for a conflict between obligations. 
Each flow begins at the conflict and explains how one half of the conflicting pair 
came to be. The connection between the pair is straightforward because they are 
identical except for their modalities which are always must for one and must not for 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 51 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
conflict, with the right and obligation again identical except for their modalities, which 
are always opposites, either may and must not or must and need not. 
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After examining the kinds of information that are available in the vicinity of a 
problem (a conflict or unavailable right), we realized that the inferences leading up to 
it provide the clearest insight into what the problem signifies and why it is present.  
 The chains of inference leading up to the problem constitute precisely 
the portion of the calculation relevant to the problem. No other parts of 
the calculation—or of the applications of license provisions, determined 
by the architecture and its annotations, that the calculation identifies—
affect whether the problem is present or not. 
 The inferences place the problem in the context of licenses, 
components and their annotations, and architectural configuration — 
the context in which a designer using the tool is already working. 
 Each chain of inference, followed in reverse, provides an unfolding 
explanation for the problem’s presence, which an analyst can explore 
as far as it is helpful in providing understanding and insight. 
Each step of a chain of inference is a point at which it can be broken—by 
replacing a component with one differently licensed, replacing one or more 
connectors to firewall off a propagating obligation, replacing a build-time component 
with one provided by users at run time, or other design decisions. 
3.  Automation 
The license metamodel, calculation, and an assortment of license 
interpretations are implemented in a Java package. The calculation builds the entire 
dag, which is then available for presentation in whatever ways are desired. Each 
abstract right and obligation in a license interpretation has its provenance in the 
license or interpretation for use in explanations. The package supports the addition 
and use of new interpretations. 
The package is connected into the system design context by its integration 
into an ArchStudio 4 plugin (Dashofy et al., 2007). The plugin maps features of 
software architectures onto the license architecture abstraction needed for the virtual 
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The argument grounds drawn from the texts of licenses are implemented 
through URLs hyperlinking into our collection of software licenses tagged for 
reference with x-{-sentence word numbers (Alspaugh, n.d.). Each URL cites the 
sentence or phrase from which a right or obligation arises. Word-level ids allow 
references to, for example, #S2.2p1.bs1w11 for the phrase beginning at word 11 of 
that sentence. 
F.  Conclusion 
HtL system design and development provide important benefits but impose 
new demands difficult to meet using only manual methods and human insight. Our 
approach for supporting HtL development and acquisition automates the calculation 
of HtL system virtual licenses. We have integrated it into a software architecture tool 
so that it can be applied at the point in the development process when the necessary 
information is available and the relevant design decisions are made. A key benefit it 
provides is the automated calculation of license conflicts, desired but unavailable 
rights, and virtual licenses. However, explaining them is of even greater value. 
We present a novel approach that presents each conflict in the form of 
structured arguments showing why each conflict exists and (by implication) points of 
attack for eliminating it. These arguments provide an informative presentation that 
brings together all of the available information in a compact, evocative form that is 
easier to interpret, act on, and verify. 
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This paper examines what is known so far about the role of open source 
software development within the world of game mods and modding practices. Game 
modding has become a leading method for developing games by customizing or 
creating OSS extensions to game software in general, and to proprietary closed 
source software games in particular. What, why, and how OSS and CSS come 
together within an application system is the subject for this study. The research 
method is observational and qualitative so as to highlight current practices and issues 
that can be associated with software engineering and game studies foundations. 
Numerous examples of different game mods and modding practices are identified 
throughout. 
A. Introduction 
User modified computer games, hereafter game mods, are a leading form of 
user-led innovation in game design and game play experience. But modded games 
are not standalone systems because they require the user to have an originally 
acquired or licensed copy of the unmodded game software. 
Modding, the practice and process of developing game mods, is an approach 
to end-user game software engineering (Burnett, Cook, & Rothermel, 2004) that 
establishes both social and technical knowledge for how to innovate by wresting 
control over game design from their original developers. At least four types of game 
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and hacking closed game systems.  Each supports different kinds of open source 
software (OSS) extensions to the base game or game run-time environment. Game 
modding tools and support environments that support the creation of such 
extensions also merit attention. Furthermore, OSS game extensions are commonly 
applied to either proprietary, closed source software (CSS) games, or to OSS 
games, but generally more so to CSS games. Why this is so also merits attention. 
Subsequently, we conceive of game mods as covering customizations, tailorings, 
remixes, or reconfigurations of game embodiments, whether in the form of game 
content, software, or hardware denoting our space of interest.  
The most direct way to become a game mod developer (a game modder) is 
through self-tutoring and self-organizing practices. Modding is a form of learning—
learning how to mod, learning to be a game developer, learning to become a game 
content/software developer, learning computer game science outside or inside an 
academic setting, and more (El-Nasr & Smith, n.d.; Scacchi, 2004). Modding is also 
a practice for learning how to work with others, especially on large, complex 
games/mods. Mod team efforts may also self organize around emergent software 
development project leaders or “want to be” (WTB) leaders, as seen for example in 
the Planeshift (see http://www.planeshift.it/) OSS massively multiplayer online role-
playing game (MMORPG) development and modding project (Scacchi, 2004). 
Game mods, modding practices, and modders are in many ways quite similar 
to their counterparts in the world of OSS development, even though they often seem 
isolated to those unaware of game software development. Modding is increasingly a 
part of mainstream technology development culture and practice, especially so for 
games, but also for hardware-centered activities like automobile or personal 
computer customization. Modders are players of the games they reconfigure, just as 
OSS developers are also users of the systems that they develop. There is no 
systematic distinction between developers and users in these communities other 
than that there are many users/players that may contribute little beyond their usage, 
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OSS portals like SourceForge.net, the domain of “Games” is the second most 
popular project category with nearly 42,000 active projects, or 20% of all projects.1 
These projects develop either OSS-based games, game engines, or game 
development tools/Software Development Kits (SDKs), and all of the top 50 projects 
have each logged more than one million downloads. Thus, the intersection of games 
and OSS covers a substantial socio-technical plane, as game modding and 
traditional OSS development are participatory, user-led modes of system 
development that rely on continual replenishment of new participants joining and 
migrating through project efforts, as well as new additions or modifications of 
content, functionality, and end-user experience (Scacchi, 2002, 2004, 2007). 
Modding and OSS projects are in many ways experiments to prototype alternative 
visions of what innovative systems might be in the near future, and so both are 
widely embraced and practiced primarily as a means for learning about new 
technologies, new system capabilities, new working relationships with potentially 
unfamiliar teammates from other cultures, and more (Scacchi, 2007). 
Consequently, game modding appears to be (a) emerging as a leading 
method for developing or customizing game software, (b) primarily reliant on the 
development and use of OSS extensions as the ways and means for game 
modding, and (c) overlapping a large community of OSS projects that develop 
computer game software and tools that has had comparatively little study. As such, 
the research questions that follow are why do these conditions exist, how have they 
emerged, and how are they put into practice in different game modding efforts. 
This paper seeks to examine what is known so far about game mods and 
modding practices. The research method in this study is observational and 
qualitative. It seeks to snapshot and highlight current practices that can be 
                                            
1  See http://www.sourceforge.net/softwaremap/index.php, accessed 15 April 2011. The 
number one category of projects is for “Development” with more than 65K OSS projects, out of 210K 
projects. So OSS Development and OSS Games together represent half of the projects currently 
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associated with software engineering and game studies, as well as how these 
practices may be applied in CSS versus OSS game modding. Numerous examples 
of different game mods and modding practices are identified throughout in order to 
help establish an empirically grounded baseline of observations from which further 
studies can build or refute. Furthermore, the four types of game mods and modding 
practices identified in this paper have been employed first-hand in game 
development projects led or produced by the author. Such observation can 
subsequently serve as a basis for further empirical study and technology 
development that ties together computer games, OSSD, software engineering, and 
game studies (Scacchi, 2002, 2004, 2007, 2010). 
B.  Related Work 
Two domains of research inform the study here: software extension within the 
field of software engineering and modding as a cultural practice within game studies. 
Each is addressed in turn. 
1. Software Extension 
Game mods embody different techniques and mechanisms for software 
extension. However, the description of game mods and modding is often absent of 
its logical roots or connections back to software engineering. As suggested, mods 
are extensions to existing game software systems, so it is appropriate to review what 
we already know about software extensions and extensibility. 
Parnas (1979) provides an early notion of software extension as an 
expression of modular software design. Accordingly, modular systems are those 
whose components can be added, removed, or updated while satisfying the original 
system functional requirements. Such concepts in turn were integrated into software 
architectural design language descriptions and configuration management tools 
(Narayanaswamy & Scacchi, 1987). However, reliance on explicit software 
architecture descriptions is not readily found in either conventional game or mod 
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software plug-ins support architectural extension, while Leveque, Estublier, and 
Vega (2009)  investigate how extension mechanisms like views and model-based 
systems support extension, also at the architectural level. Last, the modern Web 
architecture is itself designed according to principles of extensibility through open 
APIs, migration across software versions, network data content/hypertext transfer 
protocols, and representational state transfer (Fielding & Taylor, 2002). Mod-friendly 
networked multi-player games often take advantage of these capabilities. 
Elsewhere, Batory, Johnson, MacDonald, and von Heeder (2002) describe 
how domain-specific languages (for scripting) and software product lines support 
software extension, and how now such techniques are used in games that are open 
for modding. Next, OSS development, as a complementary approach to software 
engineering, relies on OSS code and associated online artifacts that are open for 
extension through modification and redistribution of their source representations 
(Scacchi, 2007). Finally, other techniques to extend the functionality or operation of 
an existing CSS system may include unauthorized modifications that might go 
beyond what the end-user license agreement might allow, and so appear to fall 
outside of what software engineering might anticipate or encourage. These include 
extensions via hacking methods like code injection or hooking, whose purpose is to 
gain/redirect control of normal program flow through overloading or intercepting 
system function calls or provide a hidden layer of interpretation, which allow for “man 
in the middle” interventions. Thus, software extensions and extensibility is a 
foundational concept in software engineering, as well as foundational to the 
development of game mods. However, the logical connections and 
common/uncommon legacy of game modding, OSS development, and software 
engineering remain under specified, which this paper begins to address. 
2. Modding as Cultural Practice 
Game modding is a practice for user content creation that creates/networks 
not only game mods but game modders. Within anthropological, behavioral, and 
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emerging cultural practice that mediates both game play and player interaction with 
other players (including the game's developers). In some early studies, modding has 
been designated as a form of “playbour” whereby player actions to create game 
extensions for use by other players is observed as a form of unpaid (or underpaid) 
labor that primarily benefits the financial and property interests of game development 
corporations or hegemonic publishers (Kücklich, 2005; Postigo, 2007; Yee, 2006).  
Game modding also modifies or transforms game play experience, since what 
is play and what is experience(d) are culturally situated. Examples of this may 
include single player games being modded into multi-player games. Therefore, the 
experience of single player versus the game environment is transformed into other 
situations including player versus player, multi-player group play, or team versus 
team play. Similarly, the modding of games to enable experiences other than 
expected game play, like using a modded game for storytelling or film-making 
experiences is also a practice of growing interest, with the emergence of a 
distinguishable community of gamer-filmmakers who produce machinima (described 
in Section 3) as either a literary medium or an art form (Kelland, 2011; Lowood & 
Nitsche, 2011; Marino, 2004). 
Other studies have observed that user/modders also benefit from modding as 
a way to achieve a sense of creative ownership and meaning in the modded games 
that they share and play with others (Postigo, 2008; Scacchi, 2002, 2004; Sotamaa, 
2010), and that game mods and modding practices become central elements in what 
constitutes play with and through games (Taylor, 2009). Finally, as already 
observed, OSS project portals like SourceForge host thousands of OSS game 
development projects that develop and deploy role-playing games (4,300 projects), 
simulation-based games (2,600), board games (2,300), side-scrolling/arcade games 
(2,000), turn-taking strategy games (1,700), multi-user dungeons or text-based 
adventure/virtual worlds (1,600), first-person shooters (1,600), MMORPG (600) and 
more. Thus, development of OSS games and related game development tools can 
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game development as well as in the world of OSS development (Scacchi, 2002, 
2004, 2007). 
C. Four Types of Game Mods 
At least four types of game mods are realized through OSS development 
practices. These include (a) user interface customizations and agents, (b) game 
conversions, (c) machinima, and (d) hacking closed source game systems. Each 
type of game mod is examined in turn and each is facilitated (or prohibited) 
according to its copyright license. 
1. User Interface Customizations and Agents 
User interfaces to games embody the practice and experience of interfacing 
users (game players) to both the game system and the play experience designed by 
the game's developers. Game developers act to constrain and govern what users 
can do and what kinds of experiences they can realize. Some users in turn seek to 
achieve a form of competitive advantage during game play by modding the user 
interface software for their game when so enabled by game developers. These 
mods acquire or reveal additional information that users believe will help their play 
performance and experience. User interface add-ons subsequently act as the 
medium through which game development studios support game product 
customization, which is a strategy for increasing end-user satisfaction and thus the 
likelihood of product success (Burnett et al., 2004).  
Three kinds of user interface customizations can be observed. First and most 
common, is the player's ability to select, attire, or accessorize a player's in-game 
identity. Second, is for players to customize the color palette and representational 
framing borders of the their game display within the human-computer interface, 
much like what can also be done with Web browsers (e.g, Firefox 4 “personas” and 
“themes”) and other end-user software applications. Third, are user interface add-on 
modules that modify the player's in-game information management dashboard, but 
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additional information about game play state that may enhance the game play 
experience as well as increase a player's sense of immersion or omniscience within 
the game world through perceptual expansion. This in turn enables awareness of 
game events not visible in the player's pre-existing in-game view. Furthermore, 
some add-on facilities (e.g., those available with the proprietary World of Warcraft 
MMORPG, scripted in the LUA language) accommodate the creation of automated 
agent scripts that can read/parse data streamed to the UI within an existing or other 
add-on dashboard component and then provide some additional value-added play 
experience, such as sending out messages or status reports to other players 
automatically. Such add-on agents modify or reconfigure the end-user play 
experience rather than the core functionality or play mechanics available to all of the 
game's other players. Consequently, the first two kinds of customizations result from 
meta-data selections within parametric system functions, whereas the third 
represents a traditional kind of user-created modular extension; one that does not 
affect the pre-existing game's functional requirements, nor one included in the 
operational source code base during subsequent system builds or releases, unless 
the extension does alter the software's requirements (e.g., by introducing a new 
security vulnerability or exploit that must be subsequently prevented). 
2. Game Conversions 
Game conversion mods are perhaps the most common form of game mods. 
Most such conversions are partial, in that they add or modify (a) in-game characters 
including user-controlled character appearance or capabilities, opponent bots, cheat 
bots, and non-player characters, (b) play objects like weapons, potions, spells, and 
other resources, (c) play levels, zones, maps, terrains, or landscapes, (d) game 
rules, or (e) play mechanics. Some more ambitious modders go as far as to 
accomplish (f) total conversions that create entirely new games from existing games 
of a kind not easily determined from the original game. For example, one of the most 
widely distributed and played total game conversions is the Counter-Strike (CS) mod 
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the CS mod gave rise to millions of players preferring to play the mod over the 
original HL game, other modders began to access the CS mod to further convert in 
part or full, to the point that Valve Software modified its game development and 
distribution business model to embrace game modding as part of the game play 
experience that is available to players who acquire a licensed copy of the HL product 
family. Valve has since marketed a number of CS variants that have sold over 10 
million copies as of 2008; thus, denoting the most successful game conversion mod, 
as well as the most lucrative in terms of subsequent retail sales derived from a game 
mod. 
Another example is found in games converted to serve a purpose other than 
entertainment, such as the development and use of games for science, technology, 
and engineering applications. For instance, the FabLab game (Scacchi, 2010) is a 
conversion of the Unreal Tournament 2007 retail game from a first-person shooter to 
a simulator for training semiconductor manufacturing technicians in diagnosing and 
treating potentially hazardous materials spills in a cleanroom environment. This 
conversion was not readily anticipated by knowledge of the Unreal games or 
underlying game engine, although it maintains operational compatibility with the 
Unreal game itself. Therefore, game conversions can re-purpose the look, feel, and 
intent of a game across application domains, while maintaining a common software 
product line (Batory et al., 2002). 
Finally, it is common practice that the underlying game engine has one set of 
license terms and conditions to protect original work (e.g., no redistribution), while 
game mods can have a different set of terms and conditions as a derived work (e.g., 
redistribution allowed only for a game mod, but not for sale). In this regard, software 
licenses embody the business model that the game development studio or publisher 
seeks to embrace, rather than just a set of property rights and constraints. For 
example, in Aion, an MMORPG from the South Korean game studio NCSoft, no user 
created mods or user interface add-ons are allowed. Attempting to incorporate such 
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subsequently put such user-modders at risk of losing their access to networked Aion 
multi-player game play. In contrast, the MMORPG World of Warcraft (WoW) allows 
for UI customization mods and add-ons only, but no other game conversions, no 
reverse engineering of the game engine, and no activity intended to bypass WoW's 
encryption mechanisms. Additionally, in one more variation, for games like Unreal 
Tournament, Half-Life, NeverWinterNights, Civilization, and many others, the EULAs 
encourage modding and the free redistribution of mods without fee to others who 
must have a licensed copy of the proprietary CSS game, but do not allow reverse 
engineering or redistribution of the CSS game engine required to run the OSS mods. 
This restriction in turn helps game companies realize the benefit of increased game 
sales by players who want to play with known mods rather than with the un-modded 
game as sold at retail. Thus, mods help improve games’ software sales, revenue, 
and profits for the game development studio, publisher, and retailer as well as 
enable new modes of game play, learning, and skill development for game modders. 
3.  Machinima 
Machinima can be viewed as the product of modding efforts that intend to 
modify the visual replay of game usage sessions.  Machinima employ computer 
games as their creative media, such that these new media are mobilized for some 
other purpose (e.g., creating online cinema or interactive art exhibitions). Machinima 
focuses attention to playing and replaying a game for the purpose of storytelling, 
movie making, or retelling of daunting or high efficiency game play/usage 
experiences (Lowood & Nitsche, 2011; Marino, 2004). Machinima is a form of 
modding the experience of playing a specific game by recording its visual play 
session history so as to achieve some other ends beyond the enjoyment (or 
frustration) of game play. These play-session histories can then be further modded 
via video editing or remixing with other media (e.g., adding music) to better enable 
cinematic storytelling or creative performance documentation. Machinima is a kind of 
play/usage history process re-enactment (cf. Scacchi, 1998), whose purpose may be 
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or cinematic (creatively steering a play session so as to manifest observable play 
process enactments that can be edited and remixed off-line to visually tell a story). 
Thus, machinima mods are a kind of extension of the game software use experience 
that is not bound to the architecture of the underlying game software system, except 
for how the game facilitates a user's ability to structure and manipulate emergent 
game play to realize a desired play process enactment history. 
4. Hacking Closed Game Systems  
Hacking a closed game system is a practice whose purpose oftentimes 
seems to be in direct challenge to the authority of commercial game developers that 
represent large, global corporate interests. Hacking proprietary game software is 
often focused not so much on how to improve competitive advantage in multi-player 
game play, but instead is focused on expanding the range of experiences that users 
may encounter through use of alternative technologies (Huang, 2003; Scacchi, 
2004). For example, Huang's (2003) study instructs readers in the practice of 
“reverse engineering” as a hacking strategy to understand both how a game platform 
was designed and how it operates in fine detail. This in turn enables reconfiguration 
of new innovative modifications or original platform designs, such as installing and 
running a Linux operating system (instead of Microsoft's proprietary CSS offering). 
Although many game developers seek to protect their intellectual property (IP) from 
reverse engineering through end-user license agreements (EULAs), whose terms 
attempt to prohibit such action under threat of legal action, reverse engineering is 
not legally prohibited. Consequently, the practice of modding closed game 
consoles/systems is often less focused on enabling players to achieve competitive 
advantage when playing retail computer games, but instead may encourage those 
few so inclined for how to understand and ultimately create computing innovations 
through reverse engineering or other modifications.  
Closed game system modding is a style of software extension used by game 
modders who are willing to forego the “protections” and quality assurances that 
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knowledge acquisition, conceptual appropriation (“owned”), and potential to innovate 
that mastery of reverse engineering affords. Consequently, players/modders who 
are willing to take responsibility for their actions (and not seek to defraud game 
producers due to false product warranty claims or copyright infringement), can enjoy 
the freedom to learn how their gaming systems work in intimate detail and potentially 
learn about game system innovation through discovery and reinvention with the 
support of others who are like-minded (cf. Scacchi, 2004). Proprietary game 
development studios may sometimes allow for such mod-based infringement of their 
games. For example, the team of modders behind the hacking and conversion of the 
single-player CSS game, Grand Theft Auto, have produced an OSS (now GPL'd) 
game mod using code injection and hooking cheating methods to realize a 
networked multi-player variant called Multi Theft Auto, that Rockstar Games has 
chosen not to prosecute for potential EULA violation, but instead to embrace as GTA 
fan culture (Wen, 2011). Nonetheless, large corporate interests may assert that their 
IP rights allow them to install CSS root kits that collect potentially private information, 
or that prevent the reactivation of previously available OSS (e.g., the Linux Kernel on 
the Sony PS3 game console2) that game system hackers seek to undo. 
Finally, games are one of the most commonly modified types of proprietary 
CSS that are transformed into “pirated games” that are “illegally downloaded.” Such 
game modding practices are focused on engaging a kind of meta-game that involves 
hacking into and modding game IP from closed to (more) open. Thus game piracy 
has become recognized as a collective, decentralized, and placeless endeavor (i.e., 
not a physical organization) that relies on torrent servers as its underground 
distribution venue for pirated game software. As recent surveys of torrent-based 
downloads reveal, in 2008 the top 10 pirated games represented about 9 million 
downloads, whereas in 2009 the top 5 pirated games represented more than 13 
million downloads, and in 2010 the top 5 pirated games approached 20 million, all 
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suggesting a substantial growth in interest in and access to such modded game 
products.3 Thus, we should not be surprised by the recent efforts of game system 
hackers that continue to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of different hardware and 
software-based techniques to encrypt and secure closed game systems from would 
be hackers. However, it is also very instructive to learn from these exploits how 
difficult it is to engineer truly secure software systems, whether or not such systems 
are games or some other type of application or package. 
D. Game Modding Software Tools and Support  
Games are most often modded with tools providing access to unencrypted 
representations of game software or game platforms. Such a representation is 
accessed and extended via a domain-specific (scripting) language. Although it might 
seem the case that game vendors would seek to discourage users from acquiring 
such tools, a widespread contrary pattern is observed. 
Game system developers are increasingly offering software tools for 
modifying the games they create or distribute as a way to increase game sales and 
market share. Game/domain-specific Software Development Kits (SDKs) provided to 
users by game development studios represent a contemporary business strategy for 
engaging users to help lead product innovation from outside the studio. Once Id 
Software, maker of the DOOM and Quake game software product line, and Epic 
Games, maker of the Unreal software game product line, started to provide 
prospective game players/modders with software tools that would allow them to edit 
game content, play mechanics, rules, or other functionality, other competing game 
development studios were pressured to make similar offerings or face a possible 
competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. However, the CSS versions of these 
                                            
3  For 2008, see http://torrentfreak.com/top-10-most-pirated-games-of-2008-081204/                                                      
    For 2009, see  http://torrentfreak.com/the-most-pirated-games-of-2009-091227/                            
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tools do not provide access to the underlying source code that embodies the 
proprietary game engine—a large software program infrastructure that coordinates 
computer graphics, user interface controls, networking, game audio, access to 
middleware libraries for game physics, and so forth. However, the complexity and 
capabilities of such a tool suite mean that any one person, or better said, any game 
development or modding team, can now access modding tools or SDKs to build 
commercial quality CSS games through OSS extensions. However, mastering these 
tools appears to be an undertaking likely to be of interest only to highly committed 
game developers who are self-supported or self-organized.  
In contrast to game modding platforms provided by game development 
studios, there are also alternatives provided by the end-user community. One 
approach can be seen with facilities provided in meta-mods like Garry's Mod or the 
AMX Mod X mod-making package. Modders can use these packages to construct a 
variety of plug-ins that provide for the development of in-game contraptions as game 
UI agents or user created art works, or to otherwise create comic books, program 
game conversions, and other kinds of user created content. However, both 
packages require that you own a licensed CSS game like Counter-Strike: Source, 
Half-Life2 or Day of Defeat: Source from Valve Software.  
A different approach to end-user game development platforms can be found 
arising from OSS games and game engines. The DOOM and Quake games and 
game engines were released as free software subject to the GPL once they were 
seen by Id Software as having reached the end of their retail product cycle. 
Thousands of games/engines, as already observed, have been developed and 
released for download. Some started from the OSS that was previously the CSS 
platform of the original games. However, the content assets (e.g., in-game artwork) 
for many of these CSS- then-OSS games are not covered by the GPL, and so user-
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is to be reused in some way.4 Nonetheless, some variants of the user-created GPL'd 
games now feature their own content that is limited/protected by Creative Commons 
licenses. 
E. Opportunities and Constraints for Modding 
Game modding demonstrates the practical value of software extension as a 
user-friendly approach to customizing software. Such software can extend games 
open to modding into diverse product lines that flourish through reliance on domain-
specific game scripting languages and integrated SDKs. Modding also demonstrates 
the success of end-users learning how to extend software to create custom user 
interface add-ons, system conversions, and replayable system usage videos as well 
as to discover security vulnerabilities. Therefore game modding represents a viable 
form of end-user engineering of complex software that may be transferable to other 
domains. 
Modding is a form of OSS-enabled collaboration. It is collaboration at a 
distance, where the collaborators, including the game developers and game users, 
are distant in space and time from each other yet they can interact in an open but 
implicitly coordinated manner through software extensions. Comparatively little 
explicit coordination arises, except when CSS game developers seek to embrace 
and encourage the creation of OSS game mods that rely on the proprietary CSS 
game engine (and also SDK) as a way to grow market share and mid share for the 
proprietary engine as a viable strategy for entry into the game industry. 
However, mods are vulnerable to evolutionary system version updates that 
can break the functionality or interface on which the mod depends. This can be 
viewed as the result of inadequate software system design practice, such that 
existing system modularization did not adequately account for software extensions 
that end-users seek, or else the original developer wanted to explicitly prohibit end-
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users from making modifications that transform game play mechanics/rules or 
unintentionally allow for modification or misappropriation of copy-protected code or 
media assets. 
Last, one of the key constraints on game modding in particular, and software 
extension in general, are the rights and obligations that are expressed in the original 
software EULA. Mods tend to be licensed using OSS or freeware licenses that allow 
for access, study, modification, and redistribution rather than using free software 
licenses (e.g., GPLv2 or GPLv3). Software extensions that might be subject to a 
reciprocal GPL-style license require that the base/original software system 
incorporate an explicit software architectural design that requires the propagation of 
reciprocal rights across an open interface, except through an LGPL software shim 
(Alspaugh, Asuncion, & Scacchi, 2009). Otherwise, the scope of effectiveness and 
copyright protections of either free or non-free software (or related media assets) 
cannot be readily determined, and thus may be subject to copyright infringement or 
licenses non-compliance allegations. They may also be treated as social 
transgressions within a community of modders whose perceived ownership of the 
game mods demands the respect and honor of a virtual license that may or may not 
be legally valid (Alspaugh, Scacchi, & Asuncion, 2010). As the OSS community has 
long recognized, software rights and freedoms are expressed through IP licenses 
that ensure whether or not a person has the right to access, study, modify, and 
redistribute the modified software as long as the obligation to include a free software 
license is included that restates these rights in unalterable form, is included with the 
OSS code and its modified distributions.   
F. Conclusions 
Modding is emerging as a viable approach for mixing proprietary CSS 
systems with OSS extensions. The result is modded systems that provide the 
benefits of OSSD to developers of proprietary CSS systems and to end-users who 
want additional functionality of their own creation or from others they trust and seek 
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In contrast, modding is not so good for protecting software and media/content 
copyrights. Modding tests the limits of software/IP copyright practices. Some 
modders want to self-determine what copy/modding rights they have or not, and 
sometimes they act in ways that treat non-free software and related media as if it 
were free software.  Who owns what, and which copy rights or obligations apply to 
that which is modded, are core socio-technical issues when engaging in modding. 
This study helps to demonstrate that game modding is becoming a leading 
method for developing or customizing game software, whether based on proprietary 
CSS or OSS game systems. OSS-based software extensions are the leading ways 
and means for modding game-based user interfaces, for converting games from one 
style/genre to another, for recording game play sessions for cinematic production 
and replay, and for hacking closed source game systems. Finally, the development 
of computer game software and tools itself represents a large community of OSS 
projects that has had comparatively little study, and thus merits further attention as 
its own cultural world as well as one for OSS development. This last consideration 
may be important because other empirical studies of OSS development that rely on 
data from SourceForge will increasingly include OSS game projects within large 
project samples. Therefore, this study has begun to address why and how these 
conditions have emerged and how they are put into practice in different game 
modding efforts. Future study should also consider whether and how modding might 
be applied and adopted in other application domains where CSS can be extended 
through OSS mods. 
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Abstract 
This paper seeks to briefly examine what is known so far about game mods 
and modding practices. Game modding has become a leading method for 
developing games by customizing extensions to game software. The research 
method in this study is observational and qualitative, so as to highlight current 
practices and issues that can be associated with software engineering foundations. 
Numerous examples of different game mods and modding practices are identified 
throughout. 
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User modified computer games, hereafter game mods, are a leading form of 
user-led innovation in game design and game play experience. But modded games 
are not new, clean-sheet standalone systems, as they require the user to have an 
originally acquired or authorized copy of the unmodded game. 
Modding, the practice and process of developing game mods, is typically a 
“Do It Yourself” (DIY) approach to end-user game software engineering (Burnett, 
Cook, & Rothermel, 2004) that can establish both social and technical knowledge for 
how to innovate by wresting control over game design from their original developers. 
At least four types of game mods can be observed: user interface customization, 
game conversions, machinima, and hacking closed game systems.  Each enables 
different kinds of extension to the base game or game run-time environment. Game 
modding tools and support environments that support the creation of such 
extensions also merit attention. Subsequently, we conceive of game mods as 
covering customizations, tailorings, and remixes—that is, software extensions—of 
game embodiments, whether in the form of game content, software, or hardware 
denoting our space of interest.  
The most direct way to become a game modder is through self-tutoring and 
self-organizing practices. Modding is a form of learning—learning how to mod, 
learning to be a game developer, learning to become a game content/software 
developer, learning computer game science outside or inside an academic setting, 
and more (El-Nasr & Smith, n.d.). Modding is also a practice for learning how to 
work with others, especially on large, complex games/mods. Mod team efforts may 
also self organize around emergent software development project leaders or “want 
to be” (WTB) leaders, as seen for example in the Planeshift open source MMOG 
development/modding project (Scacchi, 2004). 
Game mods, modding practices, and modders are in many ways quite similar 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 79 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
(FOSSD). Modding is to games, like FOSSD is to software—they are increasingly 
becoming a part of mainstream technology development culture and practice. 
Modders are players of the games they construct, just like FOSS developers are 
also users of the systems they develop. There is no systematic distinction between 
developers and users in these communities, other than that there are users/players 
that may contribute little beyond their usage, word of mouth they share with others, 
and their demand for more such systems.  FOSSD portals like SourceForge.com, as 
of January 2011, indicate that the domain of “games” appears as the third most 
popular project category with over 23,000 active projects. These projects develop 
either FOSS-based games, game engines, or game tools/Software Development 
Kits (SDKs), and all of the top 50 projects each have logged more than 1 million 
downloads. Thus, the intersection of games and FOSS covers a substantial social 
and technological plane, as both modding and FOSS development are participatory, 
user-led modes of system development that rely on the continual replenishment of 
new participants joining and migrating through project efforts as well as new 
additions or modifications of content, functionality, and end-user experience 
(Scacchi, 2002, 2004, 2007). Modding and FOSSD projects are in many ways 
experiments to prototype alternative visions of what innovative systems might be in 
the near future, and so both are widely embraced and practiced primarily as a 
means for learning about new technologies, new system capabilities, new working 
relationships with potentially unfamiliar teammates from other cultures, and more (cf. 
Scacchi, 2007). 
Consequently, game modding can be recognized as a leading method for 
developing or customizing game software. And software extensions are the leading 
ways and means for game modding. 
This paper seeks to briefly examine what is known so far about game mods 
and modding practices. The research method in this study is observational and 
qualitative so as to highlight current practices and issues that can be associated with 
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modding practices are identified throughout to help distinguish empirically grounded 
observation from conjecture.  All of the types of game mods and modding practices 
identified in this paper have been employed first-hand by game development 
projects led or produced by the author. Such observation has subsequently served 
as a basis for further empirical study and technology development that ties together 
computer games and software engineering (Scacchi, 2002, 2004, 2007). 
B. Software Extension 
Game mods embody different techniques and mechanisms for software 
extension. However, the description of game mods and modding is often absent of 
its logical roots or connections back to software engineering.  As suggested, mods 
are extensions to existing game software systems, so it is appropriate to review what 
we already know about software extensions and extensibility. 
Parnas (1979) provides an early notion of software extension as an 
expression of modular software design. Accordingly, modular systems are those 
whose components can be added, removed, or updated while satisfying the core 
system functional requirements. Such concepts in turn were integrated into software 
architectural design language descriptions and configuration management tools 
(Narayanaswamy & Scacchi, 1987). However, reliance on software architecture 
descriptions is not readily found in either conventional game or mod development. 
Hentonnen, Matinlassi, Niemela, and Kanstren (2007) examine how software plug-
ins support architectural extension, while Leveque, Estublier, and Vega (2009) 
investigate how extension mechanisms like views and model-based systems support 
extension also at the architectural level. Last, the modern Web architecture is itself 
designed according to principles of extensibility through open interfaces, migration 
across software versions, network data content/hypertext transfer protocols, and 
representational state transfer (Fielding & Taylor, 2002). Mod-friendly networked 
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Elsewhere, Batory, Johnson, MacDonald, and von Heeder (2002) describe 
how domain-specific (scripting) languages and software product lines provide 
support software extension, and it now seems clear that such techniques are 
commonly used in games that are open for modding. Finally, FOSSD has become 
another approach to extensible software engineering in practice (Scacchi, 2007). 
Therefore, software extensions and extensibility is a foundational concept in 
software engineering, and thus to no surprise, also foundational to the development 
of game mods. However, the logical connections and common/uncommon legacy 
remain under specified, which this paper seeks to address and update. 
C. Four Types of Game Mods 
1. User Interface Customizations 
User interfaces to games embody the practice and experience of interfacing 
users (game players) to the game system and play experience designed by game 
developers. Game developers act to constrain and govern what users can do, and 
what kinds of experiences they can realize. Some users in turn seek to achieve 
some competitive advantage during game play by modding the user interface 
software for their game, when so enabled by game developers, to acquire or reveal 
additional information that the users believe will help their play performance and 
experience. User interface add-ons subsequently act as the medium through which 
game development studios support game product customization as a strategy for 
increasing the likelihood of product success through end-user satisfaction (Burnett et 
al., 2004) 
Three kinds of user interface customizations can be observed. First and most 
common, is the player's ability to select, attire, or accessorize a player's in-game 
identity. Second, is for players to customize the color palette and representational 
framing borders of the their game display within the human-computer interface, 
much like what can also be done with Web browsers and other end-user software 
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game information management dashboard and that do not modify game play rules 
or functions. These add-ons provide additional information about game play or game 
state that may enhance the game play experience, as well as increase a player's 
sense of immersion or omniscience within the game world through sensory or 
perceptual expansion. This in turn enables awareness of game events not visible in 
the player's current in-game view. Consequently, the first two kinds of 
customizations result from meta-data selections within parametric system functions, 
whereas the third represents a traditional kind of modular extension that does not 
affect the pre-existing game's functional requirements. 
2. Game Conversions 
Game conversion mods are perhaps the most common form of game mods. 
Most such conversions are partial, in that they add or modify (a) in-game characters 
including user-controlled character appearance or capabilities, opponent bots, cheat 
bots, and non-player characters, (b) play objects like weapons, potions, spells, and 
other resources, (c) play levels, zones, maps, terrains, or landscapes, (d) game 
rules, or (e) play mechanics. Some more ambitious modders go as far as to 
accomplish (f) total conversions that create entirely new games from existing games 
of a kind that are not easily determined from the originating game. For example, one 
of the most widely distributed and played total game conversions is the Counter-
Strike (CS) mod of the Half-Life (HL) first-person action game from Valve Software. 
The success of the CS mod gave rise to millions of players preferring to play the 
mod over the original HL game, then other modders began to access the CS mod to 
further convert in part or full. Valve Software subsequently modified its game 
development and distribution business model to embrace game modding as part of 
the game play experience that is available to players who acquire a licensed copy of 
the HL product family. Valve has since marketed a number of CS variants that have 
sold over 10 million copies as of 2008, thus denoting the most successful game 
conversion mod, as well as the most lucrative in terms of subsequent retail sales 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v  - 83 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Another example is found in games converted to serve a purpose other than 
entertainment, such as the development and use of games for science, technology, 
and engineering applications. For instance, the FabLab game (Scacchi, 2010) is a 
conversion of the Unreal Tournament 2007 retail game from a first-person action 
shooter to a simulator for training semiconductor manufacturing technicians in 
diagnosing and treating potentially hazardous materials spills in a cleanroom 
environment. However, this conversion is not readily anticipated by knowledge of the 
Unreal games or underlying game engine, though it maintains operational 
compatibility with the Unreal game itself. Thus, game conversions can repurpose the 
look, feel, and intent of a game across application domains, while maintaining a 
common software product line (cf. Batory et al., 2002). 
Finally, it is common practice that the underlying game engine has one set of 
license terms and conditions to protect original work (e.g., no redistribution), 
whereas game mods can have a different set of terms and conditions from a derived 
work (e.g., redistribution allowed only for a game mod, but not for sale). In this 
regard, software licenses embody the business model that the game development 
studio or publisher seeks to embrace rather than just a set of property rights and 
constraints. For example, in Aion, an MMOG from the South Korean game studio 
NCSoft, no user created mods or user interface add-ons are allowed. Attempting to 
incorporate such changes would therefore conflict with its end-user license 
agreements (EULA) and subsequently put such user-modders at risk of losing their 
access to networked Aion multi-player game play. In contrast, the MMOG World of 
Warcraft (WoW) allows for UI customization mods and add-ons only, but no other 
game conversions, no reverse engineering game engine, and no activity intended to 
bypass WoW's encryption mechanisms. And, in one more variation, for games like 
Unreal Tournament, Half-Life, NeverWinterNights, Civilization and many others, the 
EULAs encourage modding and the free redistribution of mods without fee to others 
who must have a licensed game copy, but do not encourage reverse engineering or 
redistribution of the game engine required to run the mods. This restriction in turn 
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want to play with known mods, rather than with the unmodded game as sold at retail. 
Thus, mods help improve game software sales, revenue, and profits for the game 
development studio, publisher, and retailer. 
3. Machinima 
Machinima can be viewed as the product of modding efforts that intend to 
modify the visual replay of game usage sessions.  Machinima employ computer 
games as their creative media, such that these new media are mobilized for some 
other purpose (e.g., creating online cinema or interactive art exhibitions). Machinima 
focuses attention to playing and replaying a game for the purpose of story telling, 
movie making, or retelling of a daunting or high efficiency game play/usage 
experience (Marino, 2004). Machinima is a form of modding the experience of 
playing a specific game through a recording of its visual play session history so as to 
achieve some other ends beyond the enjoyment (or frustration) of game play. These 
play-session histories can then be further modded via video editing or remixing with 
other media (e.g., audio recordings) to better enable cinematic storytelling or 
creative performance documentation. Machinima is thus a kind of play/usage history 
process re-enactment (cf. Scacchi, 1998) whose purpose may be documentary 
(replaying what the player saw or experienced during a play session) or cinematic 
(creatively steering a play session so as to manifest observable play process 
enactments that can be edited and remixed off-line to visually tell a story). Thus, 
machinima mods are a kind of extension that is not bound to the architecture of the 
underlying game system, except for how the game facilitates a user's ability to 
structure and manipulate emergent game play to realize a desired play process 
enactment history. 
4. Hacking Closed Game Systems 
Hacking a closed game system is a practice whose purpose oftentimes 
seems to be in direct challenge to the authority of commercial game developers that 
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often focused not so much on how to improve competitive advantage in multi-player 
game play, but instead is focused on expanding the range of experiences that users 
may encounter through use of alternative technologies (Huang, 2003; Scacchi, 
2004). For example, Huang's (2003) study instructs readers in the practice of 
“reverse engineering” as a strategy to understand both how a game platform was 
designed and how it operates in fine detail, as a basis for developing new innovative 
modifications or original platform designs, such as installing and running a Linux 
open source operating system (instead of Microsoft's proprietary closed source 
offering). Although many game developers seek to protect their intellectual property 
(IP) from reverse engineering through EULA whose terms attempt to prohibit such 
action under threat of legal action, reverse engineering is not legally prohibited nor 
discouraged by the courts. Consequently, the practice of modding closed game 
systems is often less focused on enabling players to achieve competitive advantage 
when playing retail computer games, but instead may encourage those few so 
inclined for how to understand and ultimately create computing innovations through 
reverse engineering or other DIY game system  modifications. Thus, closed game 
system modding is a style of software extension  by game modders who are willing 
to forego the “protections” and quality assurances that closed game system 
developers provide, in order to experience the liberty, skill, and knowledge 
acquisition, as well as the potential to innovate, that mastery of reverse engineering 
affords. Consequently, players/modders who are willing to take responsibility for 
their actions (and not seek to defraud game developers or publishers due to false 
product failure warranty claims or copyright infringement) can enjoy the freedom to 
learn how their gaming systems work in intimate detail and potentially learn about 
game system innovation through discovery and reinvention with the support of 
others who are like-minded (cf. Scacchi, 2007). 
Finally, games are one of the most commonly modified types of software that 
are transformed into “pirated games” that are “illegally downloaded.” Such game 
modding practice is focused on engaging a kind of meta-game that involves 
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recognized as a collective, decentralized, and placeless endeavor (i.e., not a 
physical organization) that relies on torrent servers as its underground distribution 
venue for pirated game software.  As recent surveys of torrent-based downloads 
reveal, in 2008 the top 10 pirated games represented about 9 million downloads, 
while in 2009 the top 5 pirated games represented more than 13 million downloads, 
and in 2010 the top 5 pirated games approached 20 million, all suggesting a 
substantial growth in interest in and access to such modded game products. Thus, 
we should not be surprised by the recent efforts by game system hackers that 
continue to demonstrate the vulnerabilities of different hardware and software-based 
techniques to encrypt and secure closed game systems from would be hackers. 
However, it is also very instructive to learn from these exploits how difficult it is to 
engineer truly secure software systems, whether such systems are games or some 
other type of application or package. 
D. Game Modding Software tools and Support 
Games are most often modded with tools that provide access to an 
unencrypted representation of the game software or game platform. Such a 
representation is accessed and extended via a domain-specific (scripting) language. 
Although it might seem the case that game vendors would seek to discourage users 
from acquiring such tools, we observe a widespread contrary pattern.  
Game system developers are increasingly offering software tools for 
modifying the games they create or distribute as a way to increase game sales and 
market share. Game/domain-specific Software Development Kits (SDKs) provided to 
users by game development studios represent a contemporary business strategy for 
engaging users to help lead product innovation from outside the studio. Once Id 
Software, maker of the DOOM and Quake game software product line, and also Epic 
Games, maker of the Unreal software game product line, started to provide 
prospective game players/modders with software tools that would allow them to edit 
game content, play mechanics, rules, or other functionality, other competing game 
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competitive disadvantage in the marketplace. However, these tools do not provide 
access to the underlying source code that embodies the proprietary game engine—a 
large software program infrastructure that coordinates computer graphics, user 
interface controls, networking, game audio, access to middleware libraries for game 
physics, and so forth. However, the complexity and capabilities of such a tool suite 
mean that any one, or better said, any game development or modding team, can 
now access modding tools or SDKs to build commercial-quality games. However, 
mastering these tools appears to be a significant undertaking likely to be of interest 
only to highly committed, would-be game developers who are self-supported or self-
organized.  
 
In contrast to game modding platforms provided by game development 
studios, there are also alternatives provided by the end-user community. One 
approach can be seen with facilities provided in Garry's Mod mod-making package 
that you can use to construct a variety of fanciful contraptions as user created art 
works, or to create comic books, program game conversions, and produce other 
kinds of user created content. However, this package requires that you own a 
licensed game like Counter-Strike: Source, Half-Life2 or Day of Defeat: Source from 
Valve Software.  
A different approach to end-user game development platforms can be found 
arising from free/open source software games and game engines. The DOOM and 
Quake games and game engines were released as free software subject to the GPL 
once they were seen by Id Software as having reached the end of their retail product 
cycle. Hundreds of games/engines have been developed and released for download 
starting from the free/open source software that was the platform of the original 
games. However, the content assets for many of these games (e.g., in-game 
artwork) are not covered by the GPL, and so user-developers must still acquire a 
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Nonetheless, some variants of the user-created GPL'd games now feature their own 
content that is limited/protected by Creative Commons licenses. 
E. Opportunities for Modding and Software Engineering 
Game modding demonstrates the practical value of software extension as a 
user-friendly approach to custom software. Such software can extend games open 
to modding into diverse product lines that flourish through reliance on domain-
specific game scripting languages and integrated software development kits. 
Modding also demonstrates the success of end-users learning how to extend 
software to create custom user interface add-ons, system conversions, replayable 
system usage documentaries and movies, as well as to discover security 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, game modding represents a viable form of end-user 
engineering of complex software that may be transferable to other domains. 
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A. Overview 
Overall, our efforts developed in this research project and described in this 
report sought to articulate the acquisition research problem with respect to the 
issues identified above in order to determine what types or kinds of answers can be 
realized through this investigation. Subsequently, our efforts focused on the 
following four activities: 
 Investigating the interactions between software system acquisition 
guidelines, software system requirements, requirements for OSS, and 
consequences of alternative software system architectures that 
incorporate different mixes of OSS components, SPLs with open APIs 
and open standards (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008; Alspaugh, Asuncion, 
& Scacchi, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Scacchi, Alspaugh, & Asuncion, 
2010). This entails exploring the balance between development, 
verification, and validation of property and security rights, as well as 
contractual obligations within continuously improving OSS system 
elements while managing the evolution of OA systems at design-time, 
build-time, and release and run-time. 
 Developing and refining the formal foundations for establishing 
acquisition guidelines for use by program managers seeking to provide 
software-intensive systems in cost reducing ways that rely on 
development and deployment of secure OA systems using OSS and 
SPL technology and processes (Alspaugh et al., 2009c). 
 Developing concepts for the design of a comprehensive automated 
system that can support acquisition of OA systems so as to determine 
their conformance to acquisition guidelines/policies, contracts, and 
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 Documenting and presenting final results (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2011) 
at the 8th Annual Acquisition Research Conference, in Monterey, CA, 
May 2011, as well as at related research venues and publications 
where we can elicit the strongest critical feedback on our research 
efforts and results. 
B. Inter-Project Research Coordination 
We continue to believe that we are extremely well positioned to continue to 
leverage our recent research work and results (Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008; Alspaugh 
et al., 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Scacchi et al., 2010) with the effort described here. We 
continued to build on our recent research efforts in OSS (Scacchi, 2007, 2011a, 
2011b) and software requirements-architecture interactions (Asuncion, 2009; 
Scacchi, 2009; Scacchi & Alspaugh, 2008), as well as our track record in prior 
acquisition research studies. Similarly, we find current related research supported by 
the Department of Defense (DoD) addressing related issues in OSS (Hissam, 
Weinstock, & Bass, 2010) also influences our proposed effort. In addition, our effort 
builds from and contributes to research on software system acquisition within the 
DoD, whether focusing on SPLs (Bergey & Jones, 2010; Guertin & Clements, 2010), 
or on how to improve software system acquisition through workforce upgrades and 
government-industry teaming (Heil, 2010). Thus, we believe that our complementary 
research places us at an extraordinary advantage to conduct the proposed study 
that addresses a major strategic acquisition goal of the DoD and the three military 
Services (Starrett, 2007; Weathersby, 2007; Wheeler 2007). 
C. Prospects for Longer Term Acquisition-Related Research 
Each of the military Services has committed to orienting their major system 
acquisition programs around the adoption of an OA strategy that in turn embraces 
and encourages the adoption, development, use, and evolution of OSS. Thus, it 
would seem there is a significant need for sustained research that investigates the 
interplay and inter-relationships between (a) current/emerging guidelines for the 
acquisition of software-intensive systems within the DoD community (including 
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systems that employ an OA incorporating OSS products and production processes 
are essential to improving the effectiveness of future, software-intensive program 
acquisition efforts. Consequently, we have focused our research project, and the 
results appearing in this final report, to continue to lay new foundations for long-term 
acquisition-related research in support of the Acquisition Research Program based 
at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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